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 Belonging in America: 
How to Understand Same-Sex Marriage  
 
Robert A. Burt* 
 
The idea of “belonging” in America is not what it once was. For 
most of our national life, it was possible to identify a social group of 
“insiders’” who were sharply and self-consciously different from, and 
enjoyed a higher status than, “outsiders.” The very existence of this 
“power elite” was often viewed as inconsistent with the ethos of 
equality supposedly enshrined in our founding national document, the 
Declaration of Independence. But like it or not, and inconsistent or not 
with our professed national creed, the existence of a high status elite—
a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant male Establishment (hereinafter 
“WASP”)—was unmistakable.1  
This WASP male Establishment did not simply rule over Ameri-
can society. The WASP male Establishment was American society. 
There was a single unified conception of the American mainstream, 
and the WASPs were it. They owned America and the non-WASPs 
were, at most, resident aliens or tenants at will. 
This social imagery was given powerful, poignant expression by 
an African-American attorney arguing in the Supreme Court against 
the constitutionality of court-enforced racial restrictive covenants in 
Shelley v. Kraemer.2 “Now I’ve finished my legal argument,” he said, 
“but I want to say this before I sit down. In this Court, this house of 
the law, the Negro today stands outside, and he knocks on the door, 
over and over again. He knocks on the door and cries out, ‘Let me in, 
let me in, for I too have helped build this house.”3  
The door to the American house has indeed opened since the 
Court decided Shelley, but the single-family house that had been be-
hind the door in 1948 is no longer there. It is not simply that the post-
World War II idealized domestic relationship of a married, heterosex-
ual couple with 2.4 children has lost its exclusive hold on American 
                                                          
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1 See E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE 
IN AMERICA (1964). 
2 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
3 NORMAN SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN 193 (Ann 
Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press, 2004). 
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society.4 More importantly, the social image of the American commu-
nity is no longer monolithic, no longer a single national family.   
There are still white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant men living in Amer-
ica, but during the last half-century the WASP male Establishment has 
virtually disappeared as a ruling force in the country.  In 1960, when I 
graduated from college, it was beyond belief that fifty years later, the 
United States would be governed by a black President, a Catholic 
Vice-President, and—perhaps most startling of all—a Supreme Court 
with not even one Protestant Justice, but comprised entirely of six 
Catholics and three Jews (including three women and one black man).  
 This bit of data strongly suggests not only that the WASP male 
dominance has disappeared from American society but, more funda-
mentally, that the very idea of a single dominant American identity 
has substantially weakened, if not entirely vanished.  But, like the grin 
of the Cheshire Cat, the idea of an American mainstream—of a unified 
socially inclusive identity—lingers on.  
This shadow of an idea plays an important role in the contempo-
rary debate about state recognition of same-sex marriage. Proponents 
of this recognition continue to insist that there is a mainstream—a core 
sense of communal identity, of “belonging”—from which same-sex 
couples have been hurtfully and wrongfully excluded. These propo-
nents see themselves as storming the bastions of heteronormativity, 
demanding to be let inside. Ironically, this belief in the existence of a 
heterosexual mainstream is also shared by many of the opponents of 
same-sex marriage, who see themselves as defenders of the traditional 
but endangered bastion of normality. 
If, however, we understand that the old embodiment of the Amer-
ican mainstream—the solid phalanx of the WASP male Establish-
ment—not only has dissolved but that nothing comparable has taken its 
place, then this struggle between the advocates and opponents of lega-
lized same-sex marriage takes on a very different character. To bor-
row Matthew Arnold’s formulation from the mid-nineteenth century, 
both advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage find themselves 
“wandering between two worlds, one dead / The other powerless to be 
born.”5 Put in more prosaic terms, advocates for same-sex marriage 
are demanding access to a mainstream identity which is no longer 
available as a solid cultural construct and the opponents are not so 
                                                          
4 See Number of People in a Family, available at http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2006/  
StaceyJohnson.shtml; ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF 
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERIC TODAY (2009). 
5 Matthew Arnold, Stanzas from the Grand Chartreuse, lines 85-86 (1855), available at  
http://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poem/106.html. 
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much confident in asserting their own status as “insiders” as they are 
struggling to bolster the already weakened “insider” social status in 
American society.  
By demanding access to the supposed mainstream, the proponents 
of same-sex marriage can identify a goal through which their sense of 
exclusion and marginalization might be remedied. At the same time, 
the opponents of same-sex marriage insist that there is an American 
mainstream constituted in part by restriction of marital status to 
mixed-sex couples; these opponents can thereby deny their concern 
about themselves being marginalized, homeless, because of the disso-
lution of the very idea of the American mainstream. The battle has 
such intensity, even ferocity, because both sides suspect—though they 
may not want to acknowledge this suspicion, even to themselves—that 
no real victory is available to either of them, that the battle for inclu-
sion in an American mainstream is lost before it is begun because the 
prize, the promised Holy Grail, no longer exists.  
Between these two antagonists—the same-sex couples demanding 
admission to the honorific status of marriage and the traditionalists 
fervently resisting this demand—there is thus a deeper, if ironic, 
common bond. This bond is the shared, though unacknowledged sus-
picion that there no longer is a centered social identity in American 
life and the shared, though unacknowledged hunger for the resurrec-
tion of this cultural ideal: a shared longing for “belonging.” 
We can see this hunger for a spiritual sense of belonging in the 
changing terms of the debate over the status of same-sex couples. For 
the past fifty years at least, the rallying cry for those outside conven-
tional sexual preferences has been the “right to privacy”: a claim that 
the sexual practices of consenting adults in the privacy of their own 
home was no one’s business but their own.6 The principle targets for 
this right on behalf of same-sex couples were state laws criminalizing 
so-called homosexual sodomy. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court by a 
five-to-four vote in Bowers v. Hardwick,7 declined the opportunity to 
overturn these laws. In 2003, the Supreme Court reversed this ruling, 
going so far as to say that the 1986 holding was “not correct when it 
was decided, and it is not correct today.” In this 2003 ruling, Law-
rence v. Texas, the Court’s opinion by Justice Kennedy invoked the 
right to privacy, but it did not rigorously restrict itself to this ground 
for overturning Bowers.8 Instead, the Court explicitly drew a connec-
                                                          
6 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68-77 (2010). 
7 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
8 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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tion between the spiritual and emotional significance of mixed-sex and 
same-sex amorous relationships and then stated that the continued pre-
cedential force of Bowers “demeans the lives of homosexual per-
sons.”9  
 Even so, the Lawrence opinion insisted that its ruling had no bear-
ing on claims for same-sex marriage.10 Justice Scalia, in his customary 
acerbic mode, mocked this obiter dicta: “Do not believe it,” he said.11 
I do not believe, however, that the Court was acting disingenuously to 
create a stalking horse for an ultimate ruling in favor of same-sex 
marriage. In my view, the Court sensed the psychological and socio-
logical thinness of the privacy principle and felt impelled to add some 
rhetorical weight to it. 
The privacy principle is too thin because it rests on the premise 
that individuals can adequately define themselves without regard to 
others’ approval or disapproval of them. The privacy principle dimi-
nishes individuals’ need for a sense of “belonging” almost to the va-
nishing point. The only social connection that the privacy principle 
acknowledges is a shared communal commitment to leave one another 
alone.12 One might imagine a community that defines itself entirely in 
these terms; that the only conviction they share, the only principle that 
unites them as a social group, is a commitment to leave one another 
alone. But there is not much connectedness here. To call this assem-
blage of isolated individuals a “group” is more like an oxymoron than 
a psychologically rooted depiction of a bonded community.  
 It may be, of course, that this wary distance from one another is 
the best one might hope for in a deeply divided community, in a 
community engaged in or on the verge of civil war. But the right to be 
let alone is not relevant to the claim for state recognition of same-sex 
marriage. To the contrary, advocates for same-sex marriage want the 
state to be involved in their lives; they want the affirmative approval 
that is conveyed by the state’s award of a license to marry. These ad-
vocates cast their claim in the vocabulary of constitutionally guaran-
teed equality. They maintain that withholding the benefit of marriage 
from same-sex couples while awarding it to mixed-sex couples is an 
                                                          
9 Id. at 575. 
10 Id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).  
11 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
12 This was the core of Justice Louis Brandeis’ assertion in 1928 when he introduced the 
idea of a right to privacy into our constitutional jurisprudence. It is, he said, “the right to be let 
alone” which was “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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invidious discrimination.13 But these advocates are quite clear that they 
are not primarily seeking financial advantages or other objectively 
measurable state benefits that typically accompany marriage. “Civil 
union,” which promises no discrimination between same-sex and 
mixed-sex couples in provision of resources, is not enough to satisfy 
same-sex marriage advocates. To borrow a familiar phrase, these ad-
vocates view equal financial resources with separately designated sta-
tuses as demeaning in the same way race segregation insulted African-
Americans; in marriage as in public schools, they say, “separate is in-
herently unequal.” 
 The campaigns for same-sex marriage and for the elimination of 
racial segregation thus have a common underlying premise; but more 
than this, these two campaigns share a common difficulty. The diffi-
culty comes into sharpest focus when these two campaigns turn to the 
courts to remedy the inequality that they perceive. Consider the prob-
lem in Brown v. Board of Education.14 If the Brown plaintiffs had 
been content with obtaining equal financial resources while remaining 
in race-segregated facilities, it is easy to imagine an adequate judicial 
remedy: a court would have an objective measurement of equality and 
could readily order state provision of equal resources based on that 
measurement. But if, as the Brown plaintiffs maintained, the injury 
was not the absence of identical financial resources but was more fun-
damentally the absence of respect for the equality of blacks and 
whites, the possibility of remedy becomes much more complicated. In 
particular, this dignitary injury cannot be remedied by imposing a 
permanent state of martial law in the schoolhouse. Admitting African-
American children only when they are accompanied by armed militia 
does not erase the insult, the demeaning separate treatment, at the core 
of their prior exclusion from attending school with white children. 
Perhaps forced racial integration can be understood as a temporary 
way station toward full acknowledgment of the equal status of blacks 
and whites. But unless the white segregationists ultimately acknowl-
edge that they were wrong, unless the white population extends a 
communal relationship based on their respect for blacks’ equal status, 
the blacks’ claims for equality cannot be satisfied. The plaintiffs in 
Brown, that is, didn’t want to be left alone. They wanted to be ac-
knowledged partners in a shared communal relationship. 
 This is at its core the same remedy that advocates for same-sex 
marriage are seeking. They seek more than equal financial advantages 
available through “separate but equal” civil unions. But they also seek 
                                                          
13 Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 154-56. 
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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more than a judicial order commanding state officials to marry same-
sex couples in the same formal terms now provided for mixed-sex 
couples. Advocates for same-sex marriage want more than a piece of 
paper to pin on their lapels. They want this piece of paper to be more 
than a formality. They want this certificate to have communal mean-
ing. They want a communal acknowledgment—as Justice Kennedy put 
it in Lawrence—that a same-sex relationship may serve the same goals 
of “personal dignity and autonomy” that heterosexual couples pursue 
in their relationships.15  
 In typical litigation, if a court finds that a complainant’s rights 
have been violated, a coerced remedial order against the defendant 
provides adequate redress. But equality claims do not fit this conven-
tional model; the core of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that they have not 
been treated or respected as an equal. If a judge agrees with this com-
plaint, she cannot provide an effective remedy unless she persuades 
the defendant to honor the plaintiffs as equals. 
 But how can this happen, especially in a case as polarized and 
contentious as the current dispute about same-sex marriage? Here’s 
my answer: if we understand the underlying stake in this dispute for 
both parties in the way suggested at the beginning of this article, we 
can see a way that the currently opposed parties could ultimately come 
into a mutually respectful agreement. The antagonists are currently 
framing their disagreement in mutually exclusive, polarized terms. If 
we understand, however, that both parties—both the advocates for and 
against same-sex marriage—are responding to the unaccustomed 
weakness of the sense of belonging in the American community, we 
can see a basis for ultimately leading both parties toward a true vindi-
cation of the equality ideal.  
 The very intensity of the opposition to same-sex marriage ironical-
ly confirms this understanding; the stakes feel so high to the oppo-
nents because they sense the fragility of their communal bonds gener-
ally and thereby elevate the importance of maintaining the 
conventional boundaries of marriage, the special sense of belonging 
which that status has traditionally implied. What the opponents fail to 
see is that the advocates for same-sex marriage are investing that sta-
tus with new strength on two scores. First of all, the advocates are not 
asking for communal approval of their right to have sexual relations 
with whomever they might want. The advocates are asking for an op-
portunity to bind themselves to a life-long commitment to a marital 
partner—in Justice Kennedy’s words in Lawrence, “a personal bond 
                                                          
15 539 U.S. at 574. 
351] BELONGING IN AMERICA 357 
 
that is more enduring” than “intimate sexual conduct” as such.16 The 
same-sex partners seek to obligate themselves to one another, to create 
a strong bond of belonging between them. This faithfulness has always 
been at the core of the marital status for mixed-sex couples, though in 
recent years the existence of a permanent (or even a long-term) com-
mitment has considerably frayed, and this weakening of the marital 
bond has itself contributed to the diminution of the sense of belonging 
in our culture generally.  
 Second, the advocates for same-sex marriage are asking to embed 
their mutual commitment to one another in the context of a communal 
recognition. They might have isolated themselves from the broader 
community by simply living together and negotiating private contrac-
tual obligations between themselves (or seeking the financial advantag-
es of the marriage status through civil unions, but without the solemni-
ty of the mutual commitment that marriage has traditionally 
represented). There is thus a two-fold commitment that same-sex 
couples are seeking: a binding commitment to one another and a mu-
tual commitment of the couple, a promise of faithfulness, to the com-
munity in which they live, notwithstanding the past indignities that this 
community had heaped on them.  
 Fully understood, this effort by same-sex couples to achieve legal-
ly recognized marriage is an act of forgiveness, a wish to honor and 
affiliate with the community that had once condemned them. If the 
opponents of same-sex marriage could see the proponents’ claims in 
this light, they might also see how their own deepest desires—for 
binding commitment to their families and to their community—could 
find new strength. 
 But how can the disputing parties be led from their polarized op-
position to understand that they are seeking the common goal of a 
strengthened community? In particular, is there a proper judicial role 
in bringing about this reconciliation of opposed parties?  Brown v. 
Board of Education, the progenitor of all modern efforts to achieve 
equality for scorned groups, most clearly reveals such a role. 
 Brown might look like a conventional case where the Court de-
clared a winner (the African-Americans who had been denied equal 
treatment) and ordered compliance by the loser (the white segregation-
ists). In fact, the remedial process was much more complicated and 
much more subtle in its effectuation than this conventional account. In 
the first Brown decision, in 1954, the Court declared that the existing 
segregated relationship subordinated African-Americans and denied 
                                                          
16 Id. at 567. 
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them equal treatment and equal dignity. But the Court purposely with-
held any dictate about what might constitute a future relationship of 
recognized equality.17 In Brown II, decided in 1955, the Court per-
sisted in this silence about the future, delphically announcing only that 
the future must arrive “with all deliberate speed.”18  
So far as the Court was concerned, the future began to arrive only 
a decade later, when the nationally elected officials in Congress and 
the Presidency overwhelming approved the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These laws were enacted over the 
continued opposition of the white segregationists in Congress and in 
most Southern statehouses. But these Southerners were by now moral-
ly isolated—not simply or even primarily because the black-robed 
Nine Old Men in Washington had ruled against them, but because the 
national community now opposed them and embraced the cause of 
African-Americans, who were increasingly vocal on their own behalf 
in both the North and South. The Court set the stage for this public 
activity by endorsing and giving high visibility to the grievances of 
African-Americans; but the Court did not and could not order the vo-
luntary recognition extended to African-Americans by nationally 
elected officials.19  
 In choosing enforcement delay in Brown II, and then essentially 
waiting for a decade until Congress had voluntarily stepped forward, 
the Justices may have been motivated more by politics, more by a 
practical sense of their institutional limitations, than by a well-
formulated, principled judgment about the necessity and the proper 
technique for soliciting popular ratification of the Court’s moral im-
pulse. In retrospect, however, we can understand the Court’s path as 
both innovative and deeply principled. The Court’s chosen path in ef-
fect recognized that the equality guarantee cannot be commanded but 
must ultimately be based on voluntary, mutual consent. The Court did 
not, however, deduce from this premise that there was no possible or 
proper judicial role in pressing the opposed parties toward this mutual 
respect.20 It recognized instead that judicial initiative is sometimes 
constitutionally mandated in order to bring the parties into a relation-
ship honoring the norm of equal protection of the laws.  
 During the past seven years, since the Court’s 2003 ruling in 
                                                          
17 See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 275-85, 293 (1992). 
18 Brown v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
19 See Burt, supra note 17, at 294-303. 
20 This was the non sequitur endorsed by the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, that because 
“social equality . . . must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s 
merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals . . . the constitution of the United States cannot 
put them upon the same plane.” 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
351] BELONGING IN AMERICA 359 
 
Lawrence v. Texas, we can see this same judicially assisted process, a 
demarcated pathway, toward a new communal relationship between 
gays and straights (to use the colloquial referents). The Court took the 
first step in Lawrence, with the same effect as the Court’s initial rul-
ing in Brown I: that is, in both cases the Court ruled that the existing 
relationship of subordination and disrespect by the majority toward the 
minority was a violation of constitutional principle. But in both cases, 
the Court did not specify what the terms of a new relationship might 
be. Following Lawrence, as with Brown, the Court fell silent; and on 
the issue of relations between gays and straights, the Supreme Court 
still remains silent. As with Brown II, this may not seem to be a prin-
cipled stance but instead the result of political calculation. In the post-
Lawrence world, the calculation is less from the Court itself than from 
reform-minded litigators who, sensing that their cause will not be wel-
comed in the Supreme Court, have turned instead to state courts and 
to reliance on state constitutions. As a principled matter, in my judg-
ment, this is exactly where the reform-minded enterprise should be.21 
 For consideration of the same-sex marriage issue, there are three 
great virtues in principle for state rather than federal court adjudica-
tions. The first virtue is that any decision on the constitutional issue, 
whether for or against the availability of same-sex marriage, does not 
automatically apply to the entire United States. Any one state court is 
a participant in an on-going deliberation among the states, with no one 
court authorized to pronounce the final word in these deliberations, 
unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s conventional role in interpreting the 
federal Constitution. The second virtue of state courts is the relative 
ease with which their constitutions can be amended, compared to the 
federal Constitution which is almost impossible to amend. Accordingly 
any state court adjudication—whether for or against the availability of 
                                                          
21 A federal court ruling, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal., 2010), 
endorsing the right to same-sex marriage under the United States Constitution is now pending in 
the Ninth Circuit; as a matter of principle, however, the federal courts should refuse to adjudi-
cate this constitutional issue. There are different doctrinal routes to this result: abstention and 
ripeness are the most promising. See generally, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 127-156 (1962). Federal courts could abstain from adjudication on the 
ground that regulation of marital status is a matter primarily for state rather than national regula-
tion and that federal courts should therefore defer to the extended deliberative processes in vari-
ous state courts. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 
S.Ct. 396 (2006) (approving federal court abstention to state courts in constitutional challenge to 
gender-restrictive state marriage law); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2002) 
(“marriage, divorce and childrearing” are constitutionally protected “areas of state regulation.”) 
The issue is not ripe on the ground that federal constitutional adjudication should be preceded by 
state courts’ deliberations from which, over time, the federal courts can gauge the “accumulated 
weight of opinion” as the Supreme Court has done in ultimately overturning the application of 
the death penalty to minors or mentally retarded people. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 
(2002); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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same-sex marriage—is not the last word within that state but is subject 
to some form of popular reconsideration. It follows from this fact that 
the failure of any effort to amend a state constitution in response to a 
judicial ruling can be understood as popular acquiescence in, if not 
explicit ratification of, that ruling.  
 The third great virtue of state court adjudications is their multiplic-
ity. A federal court adjudication can move quickly from district court 
to court of appeals to the Supreme Court, and that’s it. State court ad-
judications can go on and on, from one state to the next. The very ex-
istence of this iterative process continuously reenacts the dispute be-
tween the proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage.  By dint of 
its repetition from one state to the next—even where there are differ-
ent results in the state court proceedings—the adversaries, and the 
general public witnessing media coverage of the proceedings, keep 
running into one another. From this repeated contact, the possibility 
emerges that the adversaries and the public witnesses will see one 
another in a new light: as recognizable human beings rather than mor-
al abstractions or demonic forces.  
 Some groundwork can thus be laid for recognition on both sides of 
the common bond that I have tried to identify in this article: the 
shared wish to establish a sense of belonging in a mutually supportive 
community; the shared feelings of vulnerability that arise from the 
contemporary unraveling of the traditional sense of community; and 
the shared hope to find a new sense of stability by entering into bind-
ing, communally recognized, long-term marital relationships. Judges 
can set the stage for the possibility of this kind of mutual recognition. 
It is, however, up to us—individually and as members of a communi-
ty—to decide whether this possibility becomes an actuality. 
 
 
 
 
